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A Note on Backhouse and Medema: On Walras’ Contribution to 
the Definition of Economics 
Mehrdad Vahabi (University of Paris 8) 
Introduction 
“Pure economics is, in essence, the theory of the determination of prices under a hypothetical 
régime of perfectly free competition. The sum total of all things, material or immaterial, on 
which a price can be set because they are scarce (i.e. both useful and limited in quantity), 
constitutes social wealth. Hence pure economics is also the theory of social wealth” (Walras, 
[1926]2003, p. 40). 
The insightful and rich collection of various definitions of economics provided by Backhouse 
and Medema (2009a,b) includes classical economists such as Jevons, Marshall, Menger, Mill, 
Ricardo, Smith, Say, Sidgwick, Whately, Wicksell, Wicksteed, but it includes no reference to 
the definitions of the founder of the general equilibrium of competitive markets. This lacuna 
is regrettable for at least two reasons: 
1) While the various definitions quoted by Backhouse and Medema seem to be 
often contradictory and mutually exclusive, Walras’ classification of political 
economy as ‘science,’ ‘art,’ and ‘ethics’ opens the door for a ‘synthetic method’ to 
reconcile these definitions. 
2) Contrary to what the authors suggest, the scarcity-based definition of 
economics did not originate with Robbins but rather with Auguste and Léon Walras 
(father and son). Robbin’s scarcity-based definition of economics falls within the 
scope of Léon Walras’ definition of our discipline. 
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In this short note, I will try to show the relevance of Walras’ synthetic method of defining 
economics and his pioneering role in scarcity-based definition of economics. 
Walras’ synthetic method in defining economics 
According to Backhouse and Medema’s classifications, classical authors Adam Smith and 
Jean-Baptiste Say both promote a “wealth-oriented definition” of economics (2009a, p. 223). 
However, in his first lesson of Elements of Pure Economics, Walras argued that Smith’s 
definition of the objects of political economy contradicts with the definition advocated by 
Say. For Smith, the author of Wealth of Nations, political economy acts as “a branch of the 
science of a statesman or legislator” (1776 1961, Book II, Chapter V, paragraph 31). with 
two distinct objectives: to provide plentiful revenue for the people and to supply the State 
with a sufficient income. To Walras, the underpinning criteria of these two objects are 
‘interest’ and ‘equity’ and not scientific ‘truth,’ in direct opposition with Say’s definition of 
political economy as a science: 
It is evident at a glance that J.B. Say’s definition is not only different from Adam 
Smith’s, but, from a certain point of view, is its exact opposite. According to Adam 
Smith’s view, the whole of political economy is an art rather than a science; while, 
according to Say, it is entirely a natural science. From Say’s definition it would seem 
that the production, distribution, and consumption of wealth take place, if not 
spontaneously, at least in a manner somehow independent of the will of man 
(Walras, [1926] 1993, p. 54). 
Walras tried to synthesize Smith’s and Say’s definitions in his first four lessons of Elements. 
He argued that the ‘synthetic method’ is necessary in a discipline whenever irreducible 
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opposing scientific paradigms exist (Walras, [1868]1990; [1872]2000). He suggested a 
tripartite division of economics: 
1) Pure political economy or the study of the nature of social wealth or price systems in 
market exchange as a ‘natural fact’1 – its criterion is scientific truth. 
2) Applied political economy or the study of producing social wealth in agriculture, 
industry, and trade. This field addresses ‘human facts,’ particularly the relationships 
between ‘persons’ and ‘things’2 (including animals). Its criterion is interest. 
3) Social economics or the study of distribution of the social wealth or the theory of 
property and taxes. This branch of economics also explores ‘human facts,’ specifically 
the relationships between ‘persons’ and other ‘persons.’ Its criterion is equity.  
Although applied and social economics both examine ‘human facts,’ a fundamental 
distinction must be drawn in the realm of human phenomena. Relationships between ‘persons’ 
and ‘things’ are based on the subordination of the purpose of ‘things’ to the purpose of 
‘persons.’ In fact, Robbins’ distinction between ‘ends’ and ‘means,’ to which Backhouse and 
Medema refer, already existed in Walras’ distinction between ‘persons’ and ‘things.’3 Persons 
are self-conscious and have the liberty to choose their ends, while things lack this faculty, and 
should be used as a means to achieve persons’ ends. In contrast, the relationships between 
                                                             
1 Walras divides the facts into two categories: those which result from the play of the “blind and ineluctable 
forces of nature” (natural facts) and those which result from the existence of human will, a force that is free and 
cognitive (human facts) (Walras, [1926]1993, p. 61). 
2 ‘Things’ are broadly defined, and they include animals. Two faculties distinguish ‘persons’ from ‘things’ – self-
consciousness and independent will (Walras [1926]1993, p. 62). 
3 It is noteworthy, that Walras was influenced by Kant (1785) on this point. For more details about Kant’s 
influence on Walras, see Dockèe (1996) and Rebeyrol (1999). 
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‘persons’ and other ‘persons’ are based on the reciprocity of rights and obligations. They lead 
to mutual coordination of human destinies. 
To summarize, all three branches of economics study social wealth in the following way: 
Table 1. Walras’ taxonomy of different branches of economics. 
Branch of 
Economics 
Fundamental  
Criterion 
Type of Facts Social Wealth Field of 
Studies 
Pure Political 
Economy 
Truth Natural facts Nature of 
social wealth 
Exchange 
Applied 
Political 
Economy 
Interest Human facts Production of 
social wealth 
Industry 
Social 
Economics 
Equity Human facts Distribution of 
social wealth 
Property and 
taxes 
 
Many studies have focused on this tripartite division of economics and the normative or 
positive character of Walrasian economics (see e.g., Dockès, 1996; Jaffé, 1977, 1980; 
Morishima, 1977, 1980; Rebeyrol, 1999; Walker, 1984). This discussion is beyond the scope 
of this note, but briefly, Walras considered Adam Smith’s definition of political economy to 
pertain to the ‘applied political economy’ and ‘social economics,’ whereas he considered 
Jean-Baptiste Say’s definition to pertain to the ‘pure political economy.’ Thus, borrowing 
from Backhouse and Medema’s taxonomy, Walras’ definitions of economics might be 
regrouped among ‘wealth-oriented’ ones. However, it is noteworthy that according to Walras, 
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all three branches of economics derive from the scarcity of resources. This contention is based 
on the following observation: “Value in exchange, industry and property are, then, the three 
generic phenomena or the three orders or groups of specific facts which result from the 
limitation in quantity of utilities or the scarcity of things. All three are bound up with the 
whole of social wealth and nothing else” (Walras, [1926]1993, p. 68).  
Exchange, industry, and property constitute the objects of study of pure political economy, 
applied political economy, and social economics, respectively. All three of these fields are the 
consequences of scarcity. Scarcity generates industry so that scarce resources could be 
multiplied. Scarcity also necessitates property and leads to exchange. Hence, scarcity is the 
source of social wealth, and the question of producing and distributing social wealth boils 
down to the ways that scarcity is managed. In other words, Walras provides a synthesis of 
Smith’s and Say’s ‘wealth-based’ definitions of classical economics on the basis of a 
‘scarcity-based’ definition.  
The next section will show that Walras also advocated a synthesis of ‘scarcity-based’ and 
‘market-exchange’ definitions of economics.   
Walras’ scarcity-based and exchange-based definitions of economics 
Backhouse and Medema (2009a,b) distinguished between a broad (‘scarcity-based’) definition 
of economics and a narrow (‘market exchange’) one. Walras’ definition embraces both types, 
because he considers economics to be a science of both ‘exchange value’ and ‘scarcity.’ 
Walras’ reflections on the relationships between these two principal concepts can be traced 
back to the early 1860s.  
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The original idea that the scarcity of goods and services, namely their utility and their limited 
quantity, is the cause of exchange value originated with Auguste Walras (Walras Sr.).4 The 
main theoretical problem for Léon Walras (Walras Jr.) was to reconcile this idea with a 
second line of reasoning pertaining to the determination of the exchange value by the law of 
supply and demand.  
Walras wrestled with questions such as: How is exchange value determined? Is it determined 
before the exchange by the absolute value of each product or service in accordance with their 
scarcity? Or is it determined in and through exchange by the law of supply and demand? The 
application of mathematics to the political economy demanded clarification of this point. He 
wrote three papers about these issues over the course of a decade: Walras [1860]1993; Walras 
[1869-1870]1993; and Walras [1871]1993.  
In his first paper, Walras used indeterminate functions to describe the ‘absolute value’ using 
the following equation:  
V= F (Qo , Qd)     F’ (Qo) < 0,   )     F’ (Qd) > 0    (1) 
In this equation, the ‘absolute value’ (V) of every product or service is related negatively to 
the supply quantity (Qo) and positively to the demand quantity (Qd). He traced a surface in a 
three-dimensional space and specified the function’s form in the following manner:  
V= Qd / Qo    (2) 
In case of free goods (Qo →∞, V=0); and if the market is not open, the value will be 
indeterminate (Qd = Qo = 0, V= 0/0). 
                                                             
4 Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui (1747) had a pioneering role in defining the scarcity as the cause of exchange value, 
and was a source of inspiration for Auguste Walras.  
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This formulation has an obvious problem when markets are in equilibrium, i.e., when the 
quantities of supply and demand are positive and equal (Qd = Qo). Then, the value amounts to 
1. However, this value does not capture the ‘absolute value’ – it only shows temporal 
variation in (V). Although Walras had not yet abandoned the old formulation of the law of 
supply and demand according to which the ratio of supply and demand determines price, he 
aptly noted that the function (V) is ‘indeterminable,’ because neither (V) nor (Qd) can be 
measured (contrary to Qo, which can be measured in terms of physical quantity).  
Walras noted that scarcity poses a measurement problem with regard to demand quantity. 
“The demand quantity or the sum of needs cannot be measured. There is no [measurement] 
unit for need or demand” (Walras, [1860]1993, p. 339; the word in the bracket is added). The 
demand quantity is not a physical quantity, because it includes needs and desires. Walras 
defined scarcity in terms of the ratio of demand to supply, so scarcity becomes identical to the 
‘absolute value.’ In this way, scarcity confounds the ‘absolute value’ of products and services. 
But the measurement problem undermined Walras’ first attempt to reconcile the scarcity 
explanation of the exchange value with the law of supply and demand.  
Walras’ scheme of reasoning can be depicted as follows: 
Absolute value = Scarcity= (Sum of the needs / Sum of the provisions) = (Utility / Quantity) = 
(Demand / Supply) 
If these equations were correct, then the ‘absolute value’ of every product or service would be 
identical to its scarcity, and the scarcity could be regarded as the cause of exchange value, 
i.e., the ratio between absolute values. That is what Walras tried to show; his first attempt 
assumed the determination of the absolute value prior to the exchange value, on the basis of 
scarcity. 
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However, the upshot of the non-measurability of needs and desires was that the scarcities or 
‘absolute values’ could not be measured; only their ratios could be estimated. Walras’ second 
solution assumed away the preliminary determination of ‘absolute value’ or scarcity: “It 
derives from there …that only the relative and not absolute value can be measured” (Walras, 
[1869-1870]1993, p. 354). Walras developed this idea using diverse metaphors borrowed 
from physics and mechanics. For instance, he systematically compared scarcity with the mass 
of heavy bodies, and density with the ratio of mass (directly immeasurable) to volume. 
In this second solution, demand, which was previously immeasurable as utility, becomes 
measurable as ‘budget constraint’5 – the ‘desire’ for a good can now be measured by the other 
good against which it is exchanged. “An economic desire is a desire that can be translated into 
supply of a certain quantity of wealth” (ibid., p. 336). Walras came close to a sort of ‘demand 
as purchasing power’ or effective demand. Notably, he wrote that “the demand is, in its turn, a 
function of supply” (Walras, ibid., p. 353). In 1869–1870, equation (2) was transformed into 
the following new equation: 
Vb / Va = Bd Ao / Ad Bo = [Bd /Bo] / [Ad/Ao] (3) 
While (Va) and (Vb) denote respectively the absolute values of the commodities (A) and (B), 
(Ad) and (Bd) indicate the needs or demand. They can be regarded as only “indirectly 
measurable…proportional to the quantities of the same commodity that is supplied on the 
market with the perspective of acquiring A, B through exchange” (ibid., p. 349). If (Ao) and 
(Bo) stand for the quantities supplied and effectively exchanged, and if we concede that these 
                                                             
5 Walras intimated the ‘rationality’ version of the budget constraint by imposing a restriction of ‘zero value of 
(planned) trade’ for the individual trader, but this was quid pro quo (Say’s Principle), not income constrained 
utility maximization (see Jaffé, 1954, p. 165). According to Jaffé, Walras considered his equations of exchange 
to be ‘budget constraints’ as part of the requirements for justice in exchange. This interpretation was contested 
by Walker (1996, pp. 47–48), who denied any normative implication for budget constraints in Walras. The 
budget constraint was implicitly present in Walras, but not explicitly, as shown by Costa (1998, p. 137). 
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quantities or ratios provide respectively the measurement for demand quantities of (Bd) and 
(Ad) of the other commodity against which they exchange, then the ratio of absolute values 
appears to be the square value of the ratio of exchanged quantities:  
Vb / Va = [Ao / Bo]2  (4) 
However, Walras did not follow this line of argument and did not derive this last equation. 
One year later, he suggested a third solution (Walras 1871/1993) to the problem. In this new 
attempt, he no longer makes any reference to utility. This solution reappeared in the fifth 
lesson of Eléments (Walras [1874]1988). He began by arguing that while scarcity is the cause 
of exchange value, and the exchange value is the effect; exchange can be studied in the 
opposite sense, starting with the effect.  
The equation of the exchange between two commodities was now defined as follows: 
m Va = n Vb (5) 
where (m) and (n) are the physical quantities of commodities (A) and (B). Considering 
equation (3), we now have: 
 Vb / Va = [Bd /Bo] / [Ad/Ao] = m/n 
The Eléments provided a new definition of price in terms of the ratio of absolute values, 
which at this point were employed indifferently as ‘values’ or ‘exchange values.’ “Let us 
define prices in general as ratios between values in exchange or as relative values in 
exchange…it follows…that Vb / Va = Pb = m/n” (Walras [1926]1993, p. 87). Thus, the prices 
or ratios of values in an exchange are equal to the inverse ratios of the quantities exchanged. 
In Walras’ second solution, [Bd /Bo] was the ratio of the sum of needs to the sum of the 
provisions (or scarcities); in the third solution, the relative prices were equal to the ratios of 
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the intensities of the last needs satisfied. The question now is: How is scarcity positioned in 
this final version of Walras’ theory of exchange value? 
In this third and final interpretation, scarcity appears only as a possible explanation of the 
exchange relationships at an individual level. Walras stressed:  
“To avoid any confusion between the scarcity and the exchange value, it is essential 
to note again that the exchange value is real or objective, it exists in the things; 
whereas the scarcity is in us, it is subjective or personal.  There is not such a thing as 
the scarcity of the commodity (A) or the commodity (B). Consequently, there is not 
anything as a ratio of the scarcity of (A) to the scarcity of (B)… There exist only the 
scarcities of the commodity (A) and the commodity (B) for the carriers of (1), (2), 
(3)…of these two commodities, and the common ratios of the scarcities of (A) to the 
scarcities of (B)…for these carriers. It is only in conjunction with this or that 
individual that we can…define the scarcity as the derivative of the effective utility 
with respect to the quantity owned.” ([1873]1993, p. 45–46, emphases added). 
For Walras, scarcity is not objective and does not pertain to commodities; it is subjective and 
agent-oriented. If ‘scarcity’ were interpreted in an objective sense, ‘overproduction’ (or 
‘general glut’) would be the opposite of a ‘shortage economy.’6 But in the Walrasian 
framework, ‘general glut’ and scarcity are not mutually exclusive, because scarcity is 
subjective and exists at an individual level. Lesson 28 of Walras’ Eléments ([1874]1988, p. 
255-260) was devoted to a critique of Cournot; in it, Walras concluded that the scarcities of 
commodities are always modified in variable proportions for different agents and even in 
different directions for all commodities except one, which assumes the role of ‘numeraire.’ 
                                                             
6 For example, Janos Kornai (1980) contrasted ‘overproduction’ in capitalist economies with ‘shortage economy’ 
in socialist economies.  
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Thus, Walras’ theory of social wealth embraces two systems: 1) an objective theory of 
exchange value; and 2) a subjective or agency-based theory of scarcities.  
The former system entails the general equilibrium of competitive market over which 
individual agents have no influence. This theory is determinist, and agents cannot change its 
laws; they can only discover these laws and use them to promote their interests as if they are 
confronted with ‘natural facts’.  
The second system defines how exchange relationships are established at an individual level 
according to the subjective scarcity of commodities for agents. The tension between these two 
elements is constant in Walras’ work, and has developed in two different directions since the 
Second World War. Arrow and Debreu’s general equilibrium modeling focused on the first 
system, and the LSE opportunity cost approach focused on the second dimension (Buchanan 
and Thirlby, 1973). In a sense, Robbins’ ‘scarcity-oriented’ definition of economics (Robbins, 
[1932] 1935), as well as Lange’s definition of our discipline as “the science of administration 
of scarce resources in human society” (Lange, 1945–46, p. 19) fall within Walras’ scarcity-
based definition of economics. 
Conclusions 
If modern economics since the Second World War is based on general equilibrium modeling, 
its underpinning tenets should be sought in the works of Léon Walras. Any essay on the 
definition of economics that doesn’t refer explicitly to his works will be missing a central 
piece in the history of our discipline.  
Furthermore, Walras’ ‘synthetic method’ provides a particular interpretation that brings 
together ‘wealth-based,’ ‘scarcity-based,’ and ‘market-exchange based’ definitions of 
economics. This synthesis perhaps suffers from inconsistencies, tensions, and logical gaps or 
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contradictions, but its richness can be found in the relevance and actuality of different 
tendencies that are synthesized in the Walrasian theoretical framework.  
Finally, it should be noted that the ‘scarcity-based’ definition of economics originated with 
the Walrases (father and son). Robbins followed the path that had already been set out by 
Walras, with regard to scarcity being seen as a ‘subjective’ construction existing at an 
individual level, and thus as an agent-based reality.   
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